2019年波克夏年報

mikeon88 發表於 2020-2-22 21:45 

2019年波克夏年報

In addition, we constantly seek to buy new businesses that meet three criteria. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation. Second, they must be run by able and honest managers. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price.


Fortunately, the fallout from many of my errors has been reduced by a characteristic shared by most businesses that disappoint幸運的是我選錯股的過錯會被某項特徵自然減輕: As the years pass, the “poor” business tends to stagnate, thereupon entering a state in which its operations require an ever-smaller percentage of Berkshire’s capital.爛公司發展停滯，所需資本較小 Meanwhile, our “good” businesses often tend to grow and find opportunities for investing additional capital at attractive rates. 好公司則一直成長，需要投入更多資本而且可得到高報酬 Because of these contrasting trajectories, the assets employed at Berkshire’s winners gradually become an expanding portion of our total capital.正因兩者發展軌跡不同，好公司的擴張讓波克夏的總資本越來越大

As an extreme example of those financial movements, witness Berkshire’s original textile business. When we acquired control of the company in early 1965, this beleaguered operation required nearly all of Berkshire’s capital. For some time, therefore, Berkshire’s non-earning textile assets were a huge drag on our overall returns. Eventually, though, we acquired a spread of “good” businesses, a shift that by the early 1980s caused the dwindling textile operation to employ only a tiny portion of our capital.

Charlie and I do not view the $248 billion detailed above as a collection of stock market wagers – dalliances to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street”分析師降評,  an earnings “miss”獲利不如預期,  expected Federal Reserve actions央行動作, possible political developments政治發展, forecasts by economists經濟預測 or whatever else might be the subject du jour今日焦點新聞.

What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning more than 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.

Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared to the returns that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 21⁄2% or even less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.

巴菲特和查理都不看這些東西，

表示我們平常做的一些研究沒意義，

理財雜誌和報紙3分之2版面是多餘

冷笑話1：

I must add one final item that underscores the wide scope of Berkshire’s operations. Since 2011, we have owned Lubrizol, an Ohio-based company that produces and markets oil additives throughout the world. On September 26, 2019, a fire originating at a small next-door operation spread to a large French plant owned by Lubrizol.

The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizol’s business. Even so, both the company’s property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive.

But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, “Here’s the rest of the story.” One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company owned by . . . uh, Berkshire.

In Matthew 6:3, the Bible instructs us to “Let not the left hand know what the right hand doeth.” Your chairman has clearly behaved as ordered.

冷笑話2：

Three decades ago, my Midwestern friend, Joe Rosenfield, then in his 80s, received an irritating letter from his local newspaper. In blunt words, the paper asked for biographical data it planned to use in Joe’s obituary. Joe didn’t respond. So? A month later, he got a second letter from the paper, this one labeled “URGENT.”

Charlie and I long ago entered the urgent zone. That’s not exactly great news for us. But Berkshire shareholders need not worry: Your company is 100% prepared for our departure.