See: Landmine stock cases
盈再率是我發明的公式，
2003年看波克夏年報時學到的一個觀念。
年報上巴菲特偶而介紹祂買的一些公司很好，
怎麼個好法？資本支出占盈餘比重很低 (2007年報)，
老巴用文字在敘述這個觀念，
當時我閒著無聊就把它寫成公式，
盈再率觀念來自於巴菲特，公式則是我發明的。
寫成公式把老巴的持股可口可樂、吉力刮鬍刀...等公司
財報拿出來算，的確盈再率都很低。
在寫第一本「巴菲特選股魔法書」時我只知道這樣。
The PR% formula is one that I developed after learning about the concept from reading Berkshire Hathaway's annual report in 2003. In the report, Mr. Buffett would occasionally highlight the outstanding qualities of some of the companies he invested in. He stated in the 2007 annual report that ‘‘It's far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements."
‘‘Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow."
I was inspired by Mr. Buffett's words and transformed them into a formula. I applied the formula to companies invested by Mr. Buffett, such as Coca-Cola and Gillette, and was surprised to find that their PR% was indeed low. This finding was documented in my first book, "Buffett Stock Selection Magic Book".
出了書準備上課，在編講義時想要教什麼？
把台股的一些地雷股拿來算，
赫然發現那些地雷股都有一個共同特色
盈再率超過200。
發現這個現象之後再去想背後整個道理，
過程跟牛頓發現地心引力一樣，
他也是在蘋果樹下被K到之後才想到後面的道理。
舉凡一個偉大的發明的過程都是一樣，
先發現現象，再想出道理。
After publishing the book and preparing for class, what would I want to teach when writing handouts? After analyzing some landmine stocks in the Taiwanese market, I discovered that they all have a common characteristic of PR% exceeding 200. After discovering this phenomenon, I then sought to understand the underlying reasoning behind it. The process is similar to Newton's discovery of gravity. He too was struck with the idea after being hit by an apple falling from a tree. The process of every great invention is the same, first discovering the phenomenon and then considering the cause.
我發現從盈再率和配息率這兩個指標可以事先看出地雷股，
要強調的是事先，不是事後放馬後炮，
在市場上沒人知道這家公司有問題時，
公司獲利還很好，就看出這家公司有問題。
I have found that by using PR% and dividend payout ratio indicators, it is possible to spot mine stocks early. It is important to emphasize that problems are detected before they become widespread in the market, not after the damage has already been done. This means that even if a company appears to be financially strong and highly profitable, we can spot potential problems before they become common knowledge.
兩種地雷股可以從盈再表看出來：
作假帳跟掏空。
Two types of "landmine stocks" can be identified from On's table:
accounting fraud and embezzlement.
公司為什麼要作假帳？
因為生意不好貨賣不出去，
怎麼辦？把它賣掉，賣給誰？
賣給老闆在外面設的人頭公司。
不是賣給子公司喔，否則就變成關係人交易，
是賣給老闆在外設的人頭公司，通常跟母公司無關。
Why is the company's accounting fraudulent?
The goods cannot be sold due to poor business performance.
What is the solution? Sell them. To whom?
They are sold to a paper company established by the boss outside of the parent company to avoid related party transactions. These paper companies are usually not affiliated with the parent company.
貨賣出去收到一堆應收帳款，可不可以變成現金？
可以，拿去賣給銀行，
應收帳款的買賣是銀行正常的業務。
銀行借不借錢看什麼東西？
應收帳款的銷貨對象是誰？
銷貨對象若是國際大廠Walmart、Intel、台積電，
銀行當然會借，
可是作假帳的對象若是
老闆自己在外面設的阿貓阿狗的人頭公司，銀行不會借的。
可以下結論：作假帳的公司配不出現金，
道理很簡單，帳是假的，沒賺到錢，如何配出現金。
When selling goods, we receive accounts receivable. Can we convert accounts receivable into cash? Yes, by selling it to a bank.The buying and selling of accounts receivable is a common banking activity. What does a bank consider when purchasing accounts receivable? The creditworthiness of the sales target is a critical factor. If the sales target is a reputable company such as Walmart, Intel, or TSMC, the bank is more likely to provide financing. However, if the sales target is an unknown paper company, the bank is less likely to buy the accounts receivable. This is because a company that has falsified its accounts may not have the financial means to pay in cash. The reason is simple: if the accounts are fraudulent, there will not be any real revenue to convert into cash.
不過有例外，若公司願意打腫臉充胖子，
從別的地方去弄錢來還是配得出現金，
例如舉債、辦現金增資、炒股等。
很久以前有一家鋼鐵股同光，做螺絲螺帽的，
把貨賣到斯里蘭卡，挖一個大坑埋起來，
對外宣稱營收創新高產能滿載，辦現金增資來擴產，
跟股東要錢來配給股東。
However, there are exceptions. If the company is willing to keep up appearances and pretend, they may still be able to pay cash by obtaining funds from other sources, such as borrowing, cash capital increases, and stock speculation. A long time ago, there was a steel company called Tung Kuang that produced screws and nuts. They would sell the goods to Sri Lanka, dig a big pit and bury them. The company would then publicly announce that their revenue had reached a new high, their production capacity was full, and they had raised funds from shareholders for expansion. They would then ask shareholders for money and distribute it to them.
這種打腫臉充胖子公司即便配出現金也只能配一點點，
如此防範？
很簡單，只要把配不出現金的門檻拉高，
把只能配一點點的公司排除掉。
我規定最近3年的配息率每年至少要40%才算是配得出現金，
這個標準是從講稿10/21提到的兩家地雷股，
雅新跟SAY得到的結論。
There are ways to prevent this kind of company from bluffing. One simple solution is to increase the standard for the dividend payout ratio. For example, I propose a standard of 40% for the payout ratio over the past three years, based on the examples of two landmine stocks mentioned in lecture 10/21, Yahsin (2418.TW) and SAY.
第二種地雷股是掏空資產，
掏空什麼呢？
資產有很多，流動資產、長投、固資...，
掏空一定掏空現金，
沒人在掏空固定資產的，因為要搬比較累。
The second type of landmine stock involves the misappropriation of company assets, including current assets, long-term investments, and fixed assets, among others. The primary objective of this type of misappropriation is usually to obtain cash. Fixed assets, such as property or machinery, are unlikely to be targeted because they are too heavy to move.
現金怎麼掏空？
直接盜領出來馬上事蹟敗露。
如何把現金掏出來神不知鬼不覺，
合法的方式，一時無法察覺，
最常見的管道是透過長期投資，
一筆錢去投資另外一家公司，錢匯過去之後把它領走，
過幾年再對外宣稱那家公司發生虧損，
反正轉投資發生虧損是常有的事。
Directly embezzling cash from a bank account is illegal and will quickly result in exposure. How to withdraw cash from bank legally without being notified? The most common channel is through long-term investment. Invest a sum of money in another company, then take it out after the funds have been transferred. After a few years, the company may claim a loss has occurred. In any case, investment losses are common.
還有什麼管道可以把現金掏空出去？
高價去買不值錢的土地，透過固定資產。
好幾年前OO光董事長一塊土地假設只值1億元，
用5億元賣給公司，差價他賺走了。
(本案獲判無罪)
Are there other methods to embezzle cash? One method is through fixed assets, where the company purchases land at an inflated price. For example, a few years ago, a land owned by the chairman of Axx was valued at only NT$100 million. He sold it to the company for NT$500 million, resulting in a significant profit from the price difference. (Not guilty in this case)
高價買不值錢的股票，亦即透過長期投資也可以掏空現金。
幾年前基金受益人因為結構債發生虧損，
金管會要求寶來金控、元大金控收購就是一例。
Purchasing stocks that are overvalued and not worth their price, i.e. through long-term investments, can lead to potential embezzlement of funds. Several years ago, beneficiaries of a fund suffered losses due to structured notes, leading the Financial Supervisory Commission to direct Polaris Financial Group, and Yuanta Financial Holdings (2885.TW) to repurchase the notes as an example of this.
把現金掏空出去神不知鬼不覺唯一的兩個管道
就是透過長期投資跟固定資產，
除此之外沒有其他管道。
高價買原物料製造成本上升，獲利下降，馬上看得出來。
賤賣資產在業外有處分資產損失，也看得出來。
The only two channels to embezzle cash without being noticed are through long-term investments and fixed assets. Apart from these, there are no other channels. If raw materials are purchased at inflated prices, the resulting increase in manufacturing costs and decrease in profits can be quickly detected. Furthermore, selling assets at low prices may lead to losses from non-operating asset disposals, which can also be uncovered.
長期投資和固定資產這兩管道剛好是盈再率的分子，
我發現盈再率大於200%表示公司被嚴重掏空，
股票會變成壁紙！
Long-term investment and fixed assets are the numerators of the PR% calculation. If the calculated PR% is higher than 200%, it suggests that the company may have suffered from significant embezzlement, such as through these two channels. In such cases, the company's stocks may become worthless.
從配息率和盈再率這兩個指標可以看出地雷股。
以上是理論，來看一些例子。
Landmine stocks can be detected from the two indicators of dividend payout ratio and PR%.
The above is the theory, let's look at some cases.
第一個例子訊碟，做光碟片的，
來看一下現金、應收帳款、淨利，
從這3項裡頭看出什麼端倪？
訊碟2000年賺了10億元，可是只賺到一堆應收帳款，
從616增加到1,769，剛好增加10億元，沒賺到現金，
現金的增加係辦現金增資募了65億元來的。
Let's take a look at the first example, Infodisc Technology (2491.TW), a company that produces CD-ROMs. By examining the cash, accounts receivables, and net profit, what insights can be gained from these three items? In 2000, Infodisc earned NT$1 billion, but it only accumulated a large amount of accounts receivables. Accounts receivables increased from NT$616 million to NT$1,769 million - an increase of exactly NT$1 billion - without a corresponding increase in cash. The increase in cash was due to a cash capital increase of NT$6.5 billion.
現在指訊碟只賺到一堆應收帳款沒有賺到現金，
是在放馬後砲，因已知是地雷股了，
當年它的股價曾漲到200多元，
很多人不曉得公司有問題。
可是看盈再表就一清二楚，
2000年獲利最好時，盈再率539%，超過200%，
而且之前幾年都沒配出現金。
In hindsight, it is clear that Infodisc was a landmine stock, as the company only accumulated a large amount of accounts receivables without any corresponding increase in cash. It is easy to criticize this situation in retrospect, as it is akin to being a Monday morning quarterback. Its stock was once valued at over NT$200, but many investors were not aware of the company's underlying problems. However, a closer look at the company's financial statements reveals a clear picture of its financial health. In 2000, when the company was supposedly performing well, its PR% was 539%, exceeding 200%. Additionally, the company did not distribute any cash dividends in the previous few years.
2004年第二次出事，訊碟老闆還拍胸脯保證，
他好漢做事好漢當，絕對不會落跑。
話一說完人現在美國，
公司老闆講的話來隨便聽聽就好。
訊碟後來被羅福助買走改名叫吉祥全，現在羅也跑了，
顯見公司的風水太「旺」，旺到老闆都坐不住。
In 2004, Infodisc was hit by a second scandal, and the company's owner promised that he was a responsible and honorable leader who would never abandon his duties. However, shortly after making these promises, he fled to the United States. When investing, one should not give too much weight to the words of a company's boss. Infodisc was later acquired by Fuzhu Luo and renamed Fortune Oriental. However, Luo has also fled, indicating that even the new owner could not improve the company's fortunes.
訊碟現金的增加是靠辦現金增資和ECB來的。
什麼是ECB？在歐洲發行的可轉換公司債，
允許在一定的條件底下把公司債變成股票。
The increase in Infodisc's cash was a result of a rights issue and ECB, which stands for convertible corporate bonds issued in Europe. These bonds can be converted into stocks under certain conditions.
把它賣掉，賣給誰？
賣給老闆在外設的人頭公司，
這樣會收到一堆應收帳款，如何減少？
拿去賣給銀行。它拿去賣給荷蘭Robo銀行，
銀行分不清真假還是照買，錢確實撥入戶頭，
可是約定戶頭的錢是應收帳款收多少錢進來
才可以動用多少錢出去，
帳戶是Robo銀行在控管的，所以覺得沒有風險。
帳上63億元現金不能動用，
博達做這件事情幹嘛？
用來欺騙投資人！
當時會計師查帳為什麼沒查出來？
因為博達跟銀行來共同隱密這個限制條款。
How can Procomp reduce its inventory? By selling it. And to whom? To a paper company established by the boss, which generates a bunch of accounts receivable. How can Procomp reduce its accounts receivable? By selling them to a bank. In this case, Dutch Robobank purchased them. However, the bank cannot verify the validity of the accounts receivable. Although the money has been transferred to the account, it can only be used based on the amount collected in accounts receivable. Since the account is controlled by Robobank, they believe there is no risk. The NT$6.3 billion in cash is effectively unusable. Why is Procomp doing this? To deceive investors! Why hasn't the accountant discovered these audit results? Because Procomp and the bank have covered up this restriction.
這是一個非常這重要的案例，
顯示存貨、應收帳款、現金都可以造假！
學過會計都知道，一張報表有沒有問題就看幾個科目，
存貨和應收帳款有無暴增，周轉率是否偏低。
再不行的話，就看現金有沒有增加，
現金是最單純的科目，有就有沒有就沒有。
一張報表若完全不會看就看現金有沒有增加？
博達這個例子告訴我們即便現金都可以造假。
This is a crucial case that demonstrates how inventory, accounts receivable, and cash can all be manipulated. Anyone who has studied accounting knows that if there are any issues with a financial report, they should check a few critical accounts. These include determining whether inventory and accounts receivable have increased, and whether the turnover rate is low. If that doesn't work, it depends on whether cash has increased. Cash is the most straightforward account, and even those who are not skilled at reading financial reports can determine whether cash has increased or not. However, Procomp's case teaches us that even cash can be falsified.
什麼才不能造假？
配得出來的現金才不能造假。
公司有沒有賺到錢？配得出來就真的，配不出來則是假的，
就這麼簡單。
若有人作假帳還能做出一堆配得出來的現金，
願意重金禮聘他來我公司做董事長，
這正是作假帳要看配息率的原因。
What cannot be falsified? The allocation of cash cannot be manipulated. Does the company generate profits? If it can pay dividends, then the profits are genuine. If it cannot pay dividends, then the profits are fake. It's that simple. If someone can falsify an account and still have the ability to pay dividends, I would hire them as the chairman of my company. This is why identifying false accounts is dependent on the dividend payout ratio.
博達的問題從盈再表看得一清二楚。
2000-01年獲利最好的時候盈再率536%、438%都超過200%，
前幾年也未配現金。
Procomp's issue becomes apparent from On's table. In 2000-01, when the company's profits were at their highest, the PR% (payout ratio) was 536% and 438%, both of which exceeded 200%. However, no cash was allocated in previous years.
博達做主機板的，1999年底上市，
當時報章雜誌和法人都很看好，
並非看到好主機板而是新產品砷化鎵，
手機功率放大器的零件，當時手機代工正要興起，
董事長葉素菲還當選過台灣十大傑出創業女青年，
想不到竟是一顆大地雷！
Procomp entered the motherboard market and went public at the end of 1999, receiving high recommendations from newspapers, magazines, and institutional investors. However, the real star product was not motherboards, but a new material called gallium arsenide used in mobile phone power amplifiers. This was during a time when Taiwan's mobile phone industry was about to take off, and Procomp's Chairman Sufei Ye was recognized as one of the ten outstanding young female entrepreneurs in Taiwan. Despite all this, Procomp turned out to be a major landmine!
第三個例子是陞技，也是做主機板的。
這個例子在看應收帳款周轉率和存貨周轉率這兩個周轉率，
會計上說公司的經營有沒有問題從周轉率可以看得出來。
應收帳款周轉率＝營收÷應收帳款，單位次，
0.9次指一年收不回來一次，這當然偏低，
比較正常的帳齡是3到6個月，周轉率4到2次。
不過周轉率的比較要同業比較，不同產業別的差距很大。
The third case involves Abit Computer (2407.TW), which is also a manufacturer of motherboards. This example is related to accounts receivable turnover rate and inventory turnover rate. According to accounting principles, the turnover rate is a clear indicator of a company's operational efficiency. The turnover rate of accounts receivable is calculated by dividing sales by accounts receivable, and the result is measured in time units. A turnover rate of 0.9 times means that it takes more than a year to collect the accounts receivable, which is considered very low. The normal age of accounts receivable is 3 to 6 months, resulting in a turnover rate of 4 to 2 times. However, the turnover rate should be compared within the same industry, as different industries may have significant variances.
主機板的周轉率向來偏低，因為利潤微薄，
主要靠應收帳款和應付帳款的收款天數長短不一來賺利息的錢。
舉例而言，一家主機板廠接到10萬片訂單，跟原料供應商進貨，
可是沒錢付就先欠著，主機板公司應付帳款一堆，
負債比70%很常見。
負債比這麼高還得起嗎？
當然，等到板子做好賣出之後收到一堆應收帳款。
主機板公司應收、應付帳款都一堆，
就靠兩者收款天數長短不一來賺利息的錢，
我欠人家的錢晚點還，別人欠我的趕快去收，
由此來賺利息的錢。
陞技的應收帳款周轉率只有0.9次
即便拿同業來做比較也是偏低。
但現在說它偏低是在放馬後砲，當年股價曾漲到100多元過。
The turnover rate of motherboards has always been low due to meager profits. Manufacturers mainly rely on the length of collection days for accounts receivable and accounts payable to earn interest income. For example, a motherboard manufacturer may receive an order for 100,000 pieces and purchase goods from raw material suppliers. However, if they do not have the money to pay, they must owe it first. A 70% debt ratio is very common. Can such a high debt ratio repay debt? Of course, they wait until the motherboards are sold and receive a bunch of accounts receivable. The motherboard company's receivables and payables are all piled up, and they earn interest income on the difference in the length of the two collection days. They pay the money they owe to others later and collect money that others owe them earlier in order to earn interest income. Abit's accounts receivable turnover rate is only 0.9 times, which is even low compared to its peers. However, it was only after the fact that the stock price had risen to more than NT$100 that year.
存貨周轉率的公式是銷貨成本÷存貨，
是成本不是營收，
買我選股魔法書的同學請更正，書上76頁上方公式寫錯了，
這個錯誤並非打字打錯，而是在寫書時觀念就不清楚，
請同學見諒，我的會計是被當補考之後才過的。
會計為什麼被當？
因為資產負債表左邊跟右邊要平衡，
我永遠平衡不起來，
補考時突然平衡了就過了。
The formula for inventory turnover rate is cost of goods sold divided by inventory, not sales. To those who purchased my “Magic Book“, please make the correction as the formula on page 76 is incorrect. This mistake was not a typo but a result of unclear understanding when writing the book. Please forgive me, as I only passed my accounting course after failing and taking a makeup exam. Why did I fail accounting? It was because the left side and the right side of the balance sheet need to balance each other out. I could never get it to balance properly, but during the makeup exam, I suddenly figured it out and was able to balance the sheet and pass the exam.
不過，會計被當還是有它的好處，
就不會去用這些沒有用的周轉率，
自己會去發明一個更好用的盈再率。
看盈再表很清楚，陞技2000-01年獲利最好的時候
盈再率239%、299%，超過200%，
之前都沒有配得來現金。
However, failing accounting turned out to be beneficial for me. Instead of relying on useless turnover rates, I created a PR% that I find more valuable. It's evident from On's table that Abit had its best profit in 2000-01 with a PR% of 239% and 299%, both well above 200%. Additionally, there were no cash payouts before.
2004年陞技第二次出事，股價一路跌到 1 元，
總經理出來保證EPS賺3元沒問題，
大家一聽是史上最便宜的股票，本益比只有0.3倍，
很多人跳進去買，尤其是員工。
這位總經理當年還去上台大EMBA的課，
找他兩個論文指導教授來公司當獨立董監事。
這兩位教授非常有名，一位是柯O恩，台大管理學院院長，
另一位李O修，教財務管理的名教授，
居然也被騙了去公司當獨立董監事。
我懷疑這兩位教授可能也看不懂財報，
不要以為商學院的教授就一定看得懂財報，不一定！
我大學同學在世華銀行上班，
有一次股市大跌時打電話給我，
說看到我們那位會計教授的融資追繳令，
不要以為會計教授買股票就不會被斷頭，照樣會！
為何會被斷頭？因為他沒有我的盈再表。
為何沒盈再表？因他把我當掉！
以上所述句句實言。
In 2004, Abit had its second scandal and its stock price plummeted to NT$1. The general manager guaranteed that the EPS would be NT$3, and many people bought the stock because it was considered the cheapest stock in history with a PER of only 0.3 times. Many of the buyers were employees. The general manager had also attended the EMBA program at National Taiwan University and invited two of his thesis advisors to serve as independent directors and supervisors at the company. These two professors were very famous. One of them was xxxen Ke, Dean of the School of Management at NTU, and the other was a well-known finance and management professor named xxxsiou Li. However, I suspect that these two professors may not have understood the financial reports. It is a common misconception that business school professors always understand financial reports. My university classmate works at the World Chinese Bank and called me when the stock market crashed to tell me that he saw a margin-call notice for our accounting professor. It is not true that accounting professors will not be forced to liquidate if they borrow margin loans! Why was he margin-called? Because he did not have my On's table. Why didn't he have it? Because he failed me! Every word of the above testimony is true.
作假帳的公司配不出現金，
不過若願意打腫臉充胖子，還是可以配出現金，
這裡有三個例子：大覇、雅新跟SAY。
Companies involved in accounting fraud typically cannot afford to pay high dividends, but they may still pay out some dividends as a way to conceal their fraudulent activities. Three examples of such companies are Dbtel (5304.TW), Yaxin, and SAY.
大覇做手機的，2000年第一家跳出來說接到
MOTO手機代工訂單，
2000年3G手機執照正要發行，
各國電信公司都在高價競標，因商機龐大，
市場也看好手機代工訂單將湧進台灣。
大覇消息宣布之後利多不斷：
一開始營收一再創新高，
還招待基金經理人去上海松江看工廠，看過的人都說規模宏大，
公司還透露上海廠準備在當地上市。
不久又宣稱拿到中國手機內銷權，
當時只發了五張執照，
大家期待大霸不僅代工做得很大，
連利潤較高的自有品牌業務也大有可為。
法人競相看好，某投信的基金經理人跟我說
「大霸將是手機業的廣達」，那時股王是廣達，股價漲800多元。
另一家投信經理人偷偷跟我說，他透過非常秘密的管道打聽到，
在MOTO當採購的那個人都已經跳槽到大霸去上班了，
準備去大霸領股票還賺得更多。
我們當分析師這行什麼不多就是內線最多。
In 2000, the mobile phone manufacturer Dbtel claimed to have received OEM orders for MOTO mobile phones, as 3G mobile phone licenses were about to be issued. Telecom companies around the world were bidding at high prices, and the market was optimistic that mobile phone OEM orders would flood into Taiwan. After a series of positive news announcements, the bullish trend continued. Initially, sales hit record highs for months, and the company invited fund managers to visit its factory in Songjiang, Shanghai, where they were impressed by its scale. The company also revealed that the Shanghai plant was preparing to be listed locally. Later, the company announced that it had obtained a license to sell mobile phones in China, of which only five were issued at that time. Everyone hoped that Dbtel could not only become a major OEM manufacturer, but also make more money from the more profitable own-brand business. Many institutional investors were quite optimistic about Dbtel. A fund manager told me he expected "Dbtel will become the Quanta of the mobile phone industry." Quanta was the king of stocks at the time, and its stock price rose by more than NT$800. Another investment manager told me privately that he obtained the information through very secret channels. A MOTO procurement official had jumped to work at Dbtel to get more bonuses. As research analysts, we often have access to insider information.
大霸股價從18元一路大漲到150元，突然又從150元跌回100元，
當時曾跟它的最大股東某投信的一堆基金經理人去見董事長，
最大股東見董事長這是最高層的會面，最內線了。
董事長叫莫自治跟我們吹噓了公司未來美好的前景，
講著講著快要結束的時候，老莫突然冒出一句話
「你現在買我的股票抱3年可以賺10倍」，
董事長親口跟他的最大股東這樣講。
我們聽到這句話眼睛一亮，可是沒有失去理智馬上問他
「這個3年賺10倍是從現在100元開始算，
還是從最早的18元開始算？」若從18元開始算也沒什麼搞頭。
我記得清楚莫自治斬釘截鐵地說「就是從現在100元開始算」。
很恨當時沒有錄音錄下來，
同學現在上課錄音是正確的，以後才可以作為呈堂證供！
The stock price of Dbtel surged from NT$18 to NT$150 before suddenly dropping to NT$100. During that time, I accompanied a group of fund managers from the investment trust company, which happened to be the largest shareholder, to meet with the company's chairman. This was the most senior meeting, which offered the most extensive insider information. During the meeting, the chairman invited Zihzhih Mo to talk about the company's promising future. As the meeting was wrapping up, Mo made an unexpected remark, "If you buy my stocks now and hold them for 3 years, you can earn 10 times the current value." The chairman himself repeated the statement to the largest shareholder. Although we were intrigued by the offer, we didn't immediately lose our wits, and instead asked for clarification. "Is the 10-fold return based on the current price of NT$100 or the earliest price of NT$18?" We wondered. If the return was based on NT$18, it wouldn't be that profitable. I distinctly recall Mo's confident response, "The return starts at NT$100." I regret that we didn't record the conversation, but students today should note that recording is a valid form of evidence in court.
後來大霸股價從100元跌到 1 元 ，
現在細想，莫自治說3年賺10倍這句話是對的，
去放空的話就有。
請問股票從100元跌到 1 元，放空的話可以賺幾倍？
放空是借股票來賣，以後再買來還，
放空要繳融券保證金9成，放空100元的股票須繳90元，
跌到 1 元再買來還，
所以放空最多賺 1 倍多一點。
可是做多呢，股價從 1 元漲到100元，
現股買進，可以賺99倍。
放空最多賺 1 倍，作多能賺好幾倍，
所以股票應該以作多為主，沒必要去放空，
因放空不會成為有錢人。
股票便宜時買進，一路抱到貴才賣，
賣掉之後就擺現金，或再找其他便宜的股票，
不要反手放空。
The stock price of Dbtel later plummeted from NT$100 to NT$1. Upon reflection, Mo's statement that you can earn 10 times in 3 years is correct, but only if you go short. If the stock price drops from NT$100 to NT$1, how much can you profit from going short? Short selling involves borrowing shares, selling them, and then buying them back. To go short, you must put up a 90% margin, which means you need to pay NT$90 to go short on a stock priced at NT$100. If the stock price drops to NT$1 and you buy it back, the most you can profit from short selling is just over 1 time. However, if the stock price rises from NT$1 to NT$100, buying the stock can earn you up to 99 times your investment. Therefore, it is more profitable to go long than to go short. Short selling will not make you rich. Instead, buy stocks when they are cheap and hold them until they become expensive. After selling, keep the cash or look for other undervalued stocks. Do not rush to go short.
不過有人說高點賣掉之後要再等它下來，有時候要等好久，
上一次就等了2年半才落底。
這很正常，因為景氣循環是3到5年一個循環，
從高點到低點是半個循環，等 1 年或2年半很正常。
有人說，等那麼久會不會太無聊？
無聊想要找樂子也不必到股市來找。
真的無聊，錢又太多，跟我一樣的話，
可以去買一艘遊艇來把妹妹，不是比較有趣嗎？
我們淡水要坐遊艇把妹妹很簡單，
只要60元，從渡船頭載到漁人碼頭。
However, some people suggest that after selling at a high point, you may have to wait a long time for the stock to drop again. Last time, one person waited two and a half years for the stock to reach its bottom. This is normal as the business cycle typically lasts from 3 to 5 years, with high to low being a half cycle. Waiting for a year or two and a half is not uncommon. Some may wonder if it's boring to wait so long. If you find it boring and want to have fun, the stock market doesn't have to be your only option. If you're as bored and wealthy as I am, why not buy a yacht and take a girl out for a date? Taking a yacht in Tamsui is easy and affordable, with a fare of only NT$60 from the ferry pier to Fisherman's Wharf.
大霸股價為何這樣反應？不是有接到大訂單嗎？
當時看財報，營收創新高，營業利益卻接近 0，
淨利將近18億元是從投資收入認列進來的。
公司的解釋是台灣接單，上海生產，
把利潤灌在上海廠，因準備在當地上市，
這樣解釋聽起來還蠻有道理。
Why did Dbtel's stock price react this way? Wasn't there a big order received? We checked the financial report at the time and found that although sales reached a record high, the operating profit was almost zero. The net profit of nearly NT$1.8 billion came from investment income. The company explained that Taiwan takes orders while Shanghai produces, and the profit is being poured into the Shanghai factory in preparation for local listing. This explanation seems quite reasonable.
後來查公開說明書，上海廠的貢獻幾近 0，
18億元是從2家投資公司認列進來，
這2家投資公司之前問發言人在幹嘛？
他說就在買賣公司自己的股票，
我們才恍然大悟，原來本業根本沒賺到錢，純粹靠炒股票賺錢！
可能是流血搶單，營收做得很大卻沒賺到錢，
就從炒股來賺錢，股票18元拉到150元賣光光。
這是一種形式的打腫臉充胖子！
After examining the prospectus, it was found that the contribution of the Shanghai factory was almost negligible. Two investment companies confirmed an investment of NT$1.8 billion, so we asked the spokesperson what these two investment companies were doing. He said that they were buying and selling the company's own shares. Suddenly, we discovered that Dbtel's core operations were not profitable, and the company was solely reliant on stock trading to make money. Despite competing for orders with low profit margins and achieving large sales, the company was not making any profits. The stock price skyrocketed from NT$18 to NT$150, which was merely an appearance and a bluff.
看大霸財報，以前的ROE不高，2000年突然跳上來到34%，
以為有大轉機，後來又掉下去。
2003年搞了第二次，市場的反應就很冷淡。
盈再率低，這是正確的，因它沒有掏空的問題，
它是作假帳裡的打腫臉充胖子，
破綻是之前都未配息出來。
Judging from Dbtel's financial report, the previous ROE was not high. In 2000, it suddenly jumped to 34%, which some people thought was a big turning point, but it eventually fell again. The second time in 2003, the market's reaction was very cold. The PR% was low, which is correct because it had no embezzlement problem. Rather, the company engaged in accounting fraud in order to create an illusion of financial stability. The flaw is that it had never paid out any dividends before.
因還做一些組裝，業務型態跟鴻海有點像。
後來獲利不行了就灌水，EPS只賺 1 元，
灌成3元，1 元是真的，2元假的。
這幾年來開始流行配現金就把真的 1 元配出來。
因拖欠廠商貨款被檢舉之後來才被查出來。
Yahsin, a manufacturer of printed circuit boards, enjoyed significant profits in its early years and was nicknamed the "Little Hon Hai" due to its similar business model that also involved some assembly work. However, when profits dwindled, the company resorted to inflating its earnings. This led to an increase in EPS from NT$1 to NT$3, where NT$1 represented the actual value and the remaining NT$2 were counterfeit earnings. In recent years, a trend has emerged where companies distribute dividends by including actual one-dollar bills. It was only after being reported for delayed payments to suppliers that this practice was uncovered.
雅新比較詭異的是指標好轉找來才突然爆掉。
ROE維持將近20%，
盈再率早年偏高，這幾年落到合理水準突然爆掉。
之前都沒有配現金，近年開始配息才爆掉。
最早時手上現金不多，最後一年現金30億元才爆掉。
出事之前營業活動現金都是正數。
The Yahsin case is peculiar in that the company experienced a sudden downfall despite improving indicators. Although Yahsin had consistently maintained an ROE of nearly 20%, its PR% had been high in the early years before dropping to a reasonable level. However, it suddenly spiked before the company's eventual downfall. Previously, Yahsin had not distributed cash dividends, and it was only in recent years when it began to do so that the sudden surge in cash allocation occurred. While the company had relatively little cash on hand in its early days, in the last year, it suddenly exploded to NT$3 billion. Prior to the scandal, Yahsin had positive cash from operating activities.
2006年市場傳言雅新有問題，
股價一路跌到20幾元。老闆出來澄清說，
他是一個信佛的人，在工廠頂樓還設了佛堂膜拜。
當時覺得奇怪，老闆既然說公司沒問題，
為什麼不自己買股票給我們看呢？
雅新在盈再表上從來不曾出現「合格」兩個字，
因董監持股只有8%。
我們要求董監持股至少10%，
這個指標看來不起眼，在這邊又發揮作用。
In 2006, rumors spread that Yahsin was facing problems, and the stock price plummeted to NT$20. The boss attempted to clarify the situation by stating that he was a believer in Buddhism and had built a chapel on the top floor of the factory. At the time, this explanation struck me as odd, and I wondered why the boss didn't buy shares for us to verify the company's financial stability.
Yahsin never had the word "OK" in On's table, as the directors and supervisors only accounted for 8% of the shares. It was required for the directors and supervisors to hold at least 10% of shares, which appeared to be an insignificant figure but played a crucial role in this situation.
第三例是SAY，印度軟體公司，
專門替美國汽車公司設計軟體，在美股上市。
2009年傳出作假帳，虛增現金10億元。
董事長承認過去7年獲利誇大。
SAY作假帳從財報上看完全看不出任何異樣，
ROE維持在30%，盈再率很低，每年配息，
出事之前營業活動現金流量都是正數，
作假帳還是印度人比較厲害！
The third case is SAY, an Indian software company that specializes in designing software for American automobile companies and was listed on the US stock market. In 2009, falsified accounts were reported, which had inflated SAY's cash by $1 billion. The chairman admitted that the company's profits over the past seven years had been exaggerated. Interestingly, SAY's fraudulent accounts went undetected in their financial reports. The company had maintained an ROE of 30%, a very low PR%, and paid dividends every year. Prior to this scandal, SAY had positive cash flow from operating activities. It seems that when it comes to accounting fraud, Indians are particularly adept at it !
因為雅新跟SAY這兩家公司，算它們的配息率就是這樣，
據此，我規定最近3年的配息率每年至少40%以上才算配得出現金。
40%的標準即從雅新跟SAY這兩個例子得出的結論。
Based on my calculations of the dividend payout ratios for Yaxin and SAY, I have established a criterion that the dividend payout ratio for the past three years must be at least 40% per year in order to be eligible for cash distribution. This standard is derived from the examples of Yaxin and SAY.
配息率40%這個標準，
有人問，會不會因此排除掉高成長的公司？
公司在成長階段需要買機器設備，配不出太多現金。
這當然有可能，不過基於穩健原則又何妨！
這個問題等於在問買鴻海跟中碳的差別在哪裡？
就是一個會讓你睡不著覺，一個睡得香甜。
The dividend payout ratio is set at 40%. In response, someone asked if high-growth companies would be excluded as a result. It is possible that such companies may need to invest heavily in machinery and equipment during their growth stage, leaving them with limited cash on hand. While there may be some risk involved, investing under these conditions can still be a safe choice. This question can be likened to asking about the difference between buying Hon Hai and China Steel Chemical. One may keep you awake at night, while the other can help you sleep soundly.
鴻海我們都買過，都波段操作，不敢從頭抱到尾，
因為成長快速卻配不出現金，
讓人擔心成長的極限在哪裡？怕它爆掉。
中碳我就從頭抱到尾，便宜買抱到貴才賣，
因為它賺的錢9成都配息出來，
即便獲利衰退ROE也低不了哪裡。
We have all bought Hon Hai and engaged in short-term trading as we dare not hold it for the entire term. Its rapid growth does not correspond with cash distribution, which causes concerns about the limit of its growth, and we fear it may experience a sudden decline. On the other hand, I held China Steel Chemical from start to finish. I purchased it at a cheap price and sold it when the price was high. As 90% of its profits are paid out, even if the profit declines, the ROE will not be significantly affected.
可是有人說買鴻海27年漲了436倍，
所以會睡不著覺啊！
我買中碳8年賺6倍只好洗洗睡了。
Some people say that Hon Hai stock has increased by 436 times in 27 years, which causes sleepless nights for investors. On the other hand, I invested in China Steel Chemical for 8 years and earned 6 times my initial investment, which is satisfactory enough for me to take a restful sleep.
力特做偏光板的，LCD的一個零件，
早年前曾是外資強力推薦的一家績優股。
偏光板不好做，只有日本日東良率高一點之外其它都很低，
良率低，廢料多，製造成本上升。
力特把廢料改列成固定資產的一部分，
跟機器設備一樣分年攤提，
本來廢料當年度就該打掉，
跟機器設備一樣分5年或7年攤提，
如此製作成本下降，獲利就好看許多。
Optimax (3051.TW) is a manufacturer of polarizers, a crucial component in the production of LCD screens. The company has previously been highly recommended by foreign investors due to its strong growth potential. However, the manufacturing process of polarizers is complex, and only Japan's Nitto has a high output. As a result of low output and high waste, the manufacturing costs have been on the rise. To tackle this challenge, Optimax has reclassified waste as part of its fixed asset machinery and equipment in bookkeeping, following a similar approach to equipment depreciation. This reclassification will be divided into either 5 or 7 years and is expected to reduce production costs, leading to a significant increase in profits.
為何可以這樣做？走會計法規的漏洞，
會計法允許新買的機器在試產階段所產生的廢料，
可當作機器設備的一部分，
整個過程叫做廢料成本資本化，
所謂資本化就是資本支出化，即分年攤提的意思。
在別處可看到一個名詞叫利息費用資本化，
就是分年攤提利息費用。
Why can this be done? By exploiting a loophole in accounting regulations. Under accounting laws, waste generated during the trial production phase of newly purchased machinery can be categorized as part of the machinery and equipment. This process is referred to as scrap cost capitalization. The term "capitalization" means that it is treated as a capital expenditure that is amortized over a period of years. A similar term, "interest expense capitalization," is used in other instances to refer to the amortization of interest expenses over a period of years.
力特這樣做造成固定資產暴增，
在短短2年不到的時間暴增3倍，從4,199劇升到16,941，
當時對外解釋是在快速成長的產業，買了很多機設備，
其實都是廢料。
Optimax's actions resulted in a significant increase in fixed assets, which tripled from 4,199 to 16,941 in less than two years. The company justified this by stating that they were in a fast-growing industry and had purchased many machines and equipment. However, in reality, these assets were primarily waste products.
它這樣做剛好盈再率可以看得出來，
固定資產暴增，盈再率接近200%。
This scandal can be detected by the PR ratio. As fixed assets increased dramatically, the PR ratio rose to nearly 200%.
2004年上課我就把它列為地雷股候選人，
當時股價還在70幾元，沒人知道這家公司有問題，
後來股價一路跌到 1 元。
它被交易所查帳查出來，要求重編財報。
這張表是重編前的數字，
現在盈再表按出來是重編後的數字，
表示即便拿假的財報我們一樣看得出問題來。
In 2004, I flagged this company as a potential landmine stock candidate. At the time, the stock was trading at around NT$70 with no apparent issues. However, the stock price then plummeted to NT$1, exposing the company's financial irregularities. A stock exchange audit uncovered irregularities that resulted in the company's financial reports being redacted. The tables in this document show financial data prior to restatement. Currently, On's tables have been renumbered. This shows that even with false financial reporting, potential problems can still be identified.
為何即便假財報我們一樣看得出來？
因為作假帳是宣稱賺很大卻只配一點息，配息率會低。
把現金掏空出去則必要有出路，即長投和固資，
盈再率當然高。
How can we detect falsified financial reports? One indicator is a company's low dividend payout ratio, which may occur when a company claims to have high profits but only distributes a small amount of dividends. To conceal cash misappropriation, a company may resort to long-term investments and fixed capital. A high PR% is also a sign of such actions.
勤美是2009年看電視的一則新聞報導，
檢調去搜索他們公司。
看到新聞去按盈再表，當場嚇一跳，
難道檢調也有盈再表？檢調也是按盈再表在辦案嗎？
只要盈再率超過200%的通通抓起來！
I came across the CMP (1532.TW) case on TV news in 2009. Prosecutors conducted a search of the company. As I watched the news, I checked the earnings report and was shocked to find that the prosecutors seemed to have the same earnings report. I wondered if the prosecutors were also using On’s table to handle the case. It seemed that anyone with a PR% of over 200% was being arrested.
勤美高價買不良債權，買環亞百貨，
請問高價買不良債權哪個科目會高？
長投，導致盈再率超過200%。
CMP has purchased bad debts at high prices because they acquired Asia Department Store. What will be the impact on the accounts when purchasing bad debts at a high price? This would likely result in a long-term investment, potentially leading to a PR% exceeding 200%.
建議同學要養成習慣，看到新的地雷股時就去按盈再表，
看在事先能否看得出來？
有看不出來的例子請通報一下。
I encourage students to cultivate the habit of checking On's table whenever they encounter a new case of landmine stocks, in order to detect them in advance. Any exceptions to this rule should be reported promptly.
這裡有2家中國的地雷股。
第一個例子五糧液，2009年傳出虛增營收10億元，作假帳。
同學跟我通報這個消息我去按盈再表就這樣，
配息率很低僅15%不到。
China has two landmine stocks, with Wuliangye (000858.TW) being the first one. In 2009, it was reported that false accounts had inflated the company's sales by RMB 1 billion. A student informed me of this news, and I confirmed it on On's table, which revealed that the stock has a low dividend payout ratio of less than 15%.
江西賽維是中國的太陽能廠，2009年財務吃緊，
它在美國上市代號LDK。
盈再率超過200%，危險訊號，
有兩種可能性，一是被嚴重淘空，
二是在大量投資的產業，
DRAM、LCD和太陽能都是，下場都很慘。
太陽能看來是不宜投資的產業。
不僅中國的太陽能廠，台灣的太陽能公司盈再率也都超過200%。
LDK Solar (LDK) is a Chinese solar power plant that encountered financial difficulties in 2009. It is listed as LDK in the US. Its PR% exceeds 200%, which is a red flag. There are two potential explanations for this: embezzlement or aggressive expansion. This is not only applicable to the solar power industry but also to other sectors, such as DRAM, LCD, and more. As a result, investing in solar energy may not be wise in the long run. This is not only evident in Chinese solar power plants but also in Taiwanese solar companies where the PR% exceeds 200%.
只有作假帳和掏空才可能從財報中看出來，
其它類型地雷股則很難，因為問題不在跟財報上。
例如業務風險特別大，次級房貸、DRAM這種業務，
或者老闆跑去賭博是去玩期貨、選擇權把整個公司玩垮掉。
期貨、選擇權只要價格波動劇烈整個本金瞬間賠光，
等到3個月之後看到財報已經來不及。
唯一防範之道是被動式的多種果樹，分散風險。
Only fraudulent accounting and embezzlement can be detected through financial reports; other types of stock pitfalls are hard to spot because the issues do not appear on the financial statements. For instance, businesses with high operational risks like subprime mortgages or DRAM operations, or cases where the boss gambles away the company's future by speculating in futures and options, can cause the company to collapse. In the realm of futures and options, severe price fluctuations can wipe out all the capital instantly, and by the time the financial reports are viewed three months later, it's too late. The only way to mitigate such risks is through a passive approach of diversifying into multiple types of investments, akin to planting various kinds of fruit trees.
這裡有幾個例子，貝爾斯登是美國的一家投資銀行，
專做承銷業務的證券公司，幫企業籌資和併購，
這是一家績優股。
2008年突然宣布公司一股要用2元賣給JP摩根，
股價直接從50幾元跌到2元。
在出事之前手上現金來還有350幾億美金，1兆多台幣，
一夕之間倒閉，從財報上完全看不出任何徵兆。
不只貝爾斯登，另外2家雷曼跟美林也都是績優股，
因次級房貸風暴倒閉，事先毫無徵兆。
Let's take a few examples. Bear Stearns (BSC) was a blue-chip investment bank in the US that specialized in underwriting business, helping companies raise funds, and mergers and acquisitions. However, in 2008, the company suddenly announced its sale to JP Morgan for $2 per share, resulting in a steep drop in stock price from $50 to $2. Despite having $35 billion in cash reserves, equivalent to over NT$1 trillion, the company went bankrupt overnight with no prior indication in the financial reports. Not only Bear Stearns, but also the other two blue-chip companies, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, went bankrupt without any prior warning during the subprime mortgage crisis.
什麼是次級房貸？
就是信用比較差的人想買房子，借錢給他去買房子，
因信用比較差所以房貸利率高，
還被認為利潤不錯的業務。
2007年美國利率突然拉升造成房地產崩跌，
這些人開始付不出房貸，
付不出房貸房子就被拍賣處理掉，
為何2008年問題搞到那麼大？
原因就是衍生性金融商品所惹的禍。
買房子的人跟銀行申請貸款，
銀行不會把房貸的風險攬在自己身上，
通常會再轉貸出去給二房，
Fraddie Mac 和Fannie Mae，類似台灣的土地銀行。
跟保險公司也是一樣，
保險公司不會把所有保險的風險攬在自己身上，
會轉保給再保公司，目的是要提早變現跟分散風險。
What is a subprime mortgage? It is a type of loan intended for people with poor credit who want to buy a house. Because of their poor credit, the mortgage interest rates are high, making it a profitable business. The sudden rise of interest rates in the US in 2007 caused the real estate market to collapse, making it difficult for people to pay their mortgages. If they can't pay, their house will be auctioned off.
Why did the problem become so significant in 2008? The reason is the trouble caused by financial derivatives. When a person buys a house and applies for a loan from a bank, the bank will not take the risk of the mortgage on itself. Usually, the mortgage is re-lent to two companies, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, similar to a land bank in Taiwan. Similarly, insurance companies will not take all insurance risks on themselves. The insurance will be transferred to a reinsurance company for the purpose of early realization and risk diversification.
2008年的利率降得很低，一年定存僅1%。
利潤這麼低的金融商品誰有興趣來買？
那時流行把這些商品透過衍生性金融商品再去包裝，
衍生性金融商品的槓桿倍數高，
期貨本金 1 元可以玩到20元的輸贏，
選擇權可以玩到14元輸贏，
亦即期貨價格波動5%整個本金就賠光，
選擇權波動7％就賠光。
2017年台股曾發生期貨閃崩，幾秒之內大跌10%，
只是閉眼養神一下，再睜開眼就破產了，
就是這麼可怕！
In 2008, interest rates dropped to a historically low level, with one-year time deposits yielding only 1%. Who would be interested in buying such a low-margin financial product? At that time, packaging these products through financial derivatives was popular. The leverage ratio of financial derivatives was very high, with a futures principal of $1 potentially yielding a profit of $20, and options up to $14. In other words, a 5% fluctuation in futures price could wipe out the entire principal, while a 7% fluctuation in options would lead to a total loss. In 2017, Taiwan's stock market futures plummeted and fell by 10% within seconds. It only takes a momentary lapse of attention to go bankrupt. It is truly a frightening prospect.
雷曼連動債也是衍生性金融商品包裝的結果，
當年一些定存族被拐去買連動債，因為利率特別高，
請問同學有沒有人記得當時連動債的利率幾％嗎？
這裡有沒有苦主的？
通常都說是他的朋友買的。
7％到15%！
同學會不會覺得奇怪，當時定存利率只有1％，
為何連動債利率竟然7%到15%這麼高呢？
原因即衍生性金融商品包裝的結果。
理專鼓吹「錢擺在銀行利率只有1%，
不如來買連動債有7％到15%，
而且它是公司債，持有到期就能還本。」
很多人因此去買連動債，
這也是衍生性金融商品惹的禍。
Lehman Brothers' structured notes were financial derivatives that were bundled together and had a reputation for having high yield rates, which prompted many depositors to invest in them. Does anyone recall the exact yield rates of these notes during that period? Did anyone here experience losses due to investing in them? It's commonly said that the investors themselves did not make the purchase, but rather a friend did. These notes offered returns of 7% to 15%, while the interest rate on a one-year time deposit was only 1%. The reason behind the high yield on structured notes was due to their link to derivatives. Financial advisors encouraged individuals to invest in these linked bonds, stating that "placing money in a bank with an interest rate of only 1% is not as good as investing in linked bonds that offer a yield of 7% to 15%. Furthermore, these bonds are corporate bonds that can be redeemed upon maturity," making them an appealing investment opportunity for many. However, it was ultimately the derivatives that caused the problems.
2008年的問題非常嚴重，柏南克在聽證會上表示
「2008年是有史以來最嚴重的金融風暴，
甚至比1929年經濟大蕭條還可怕。
2008年最危急之時，
最重要的13家金融機構有12家在一到兩個禮拜之內即將倒閉。」
現在聽到他這樣講都覺得頭皮發麻，
原來我們的世界在2008年差一點毁滅掉！
試想若美國前12大銀行倒閉跟世界末日何異？
這是為何美國政府不惜印鈔票要解決這個問題。
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke testified at a hearing that the problem in 2008 was extremely severe. He stated that the 2008 financial crisis was the most severe in global history, surpassing even the Great Depression. Bernanke noted that 12 of the country's 13 largest financial institutions were on the brink of collapse before they received government assistance. Reflecting on his testimony, I am struck by the gravity of the situation. It is alarming to think that the world economy was on the brink of collapse in 2008. If the top 12 banks in the United States had gone bankrupt, it could have had catastrophic consequences. This is why the US government was willing to print money to address the economic crisis.
同學問，1929年經濟大蕭條到底多可怕呢？
那個時代就長得這樣子，美國失業率25%，
很多人失業在街道上排隊領食物，
看板「免費的咖啡，還有甜甜圈給失業的人」。
卓別林是那個時代的人物，
他演的默劇在反應那個時代的故事，
我小時候看過他演的一部默劇，印象深刻。
我的小時候就是指40幾年前，
那時中視剛剛開播，常播他的默劇。
他演到想要吃牛排，卻買不起，
只好把皮鞋拿來烤一烤煮了吃，他的特徵就是皮鞋特別大。
這個問題若發生在我們這個年代會更嚴重，
因為我們的皮鞋來都是塑膠皮，口感比較差。
因此美國政府不惜印鈔票也要解決這個問題。
A student inquired about the severity of the Great Depression of 1929. This photograph from that time period shows the distressing reality of a 25% unemployment rate in the United States, where many people were jobless and lining up for food. One banner read, "Free coffee and doughnuts for the unemployed." Charlie Chaplin was a prominent figure of that era, and his pantomimes captured the essence of the times. I remember being impressed when I saw his pantomimes as a child more than 40 years ago, back when CTV had just started broadcasting and often aired his performances. In one skit, Chaplin's character desperately wanted to eat steak, but couldn't afford it. He resorted to baking his shoes and eating them, which was made more comical by his characteristically large leather shoes. If a similar situation were to occur in modern times, it would be even more dire, as most shoes are made of plastic instead of leather, which has a less appealing taste. That's why the US government would not hesitate to print money to address such economic crises.
2008年問題事先有誰看得出來？
就這個巴菲特看得出來。
在2003年報老巴大罵「衍生性金融商品是大規模毁滅性武器，
總有一天會把金融市場炸掉。」
果然料中。
老巴在併購金融公司時都會到它的自營部去查帳，
若有在玩衍生性金融商品就要求趕快把合約處理掉。
這種事情對我們小散戶沒辦法查帳，是看不出來的。
Who was able to anticipate the 2008 crisis? Warren Buffett was one such person. In his 2003 report, he criticized derivatives as "financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal." As he had foreseen, the crisis unfolded in 2008. When Buffett acquires a financial company, he personally inspects its trading room to scrutinize its accounts. If they are found to be involved in financial derivatives, he promptly eliminates them from consideration. Unfortunately, retail investors are unable to perform such checks, as these types of financial activities are not always detectable in financial reports.
宏億國賣DRAM的上櫃公司，
賣DRAM或IC的都有一個基本常識，
不能囤積太多存貨，因IC的價格波動劇烈，
存貨太多很容易被現貨價格燙到，
這是眾人皆知的基本常識。
想不到宏億國在2008年居然去買滿了DRAM，
淨值10億元，存貨13億元，全部DRAM。
2008年上半年油價漲到最高147美元一桶，
原料價格都在漲，唯獨DRAM不漲。
宏億國想該輪到DRAM漲一下吧，
全部押滿，想要發一次show hand比較快，
不料後來DRAM不僅沒漲且續跌，公司整個就賠光了。
這很難令人料想到，業者應該比我們更知DRAM的風險，
卻輕忽大意。
DBK International (3079.TW), which is traded on the OTC market, specializes in selling DRAM. Those in the DRAM or IC business tend to keep low inventory levels due to the volatility of IC prices, which can easily eat into company profits. This is common knowledge. However, in 2008, DBK unexpectedly purchased a large amount of DRAM despite having net assets of only NT$1 billion and an inventory worth NT$1.3 billion, all of which consisted of DRAM. In the first half of 2008, oil prices hit a record high of $147 per barrel, causing raw material prices to rise correspondingly. However, DRAM prices did not follow suit. DBK believed that DRAM prices would increase and made a risky gamble to profit quickly. Unfortunately, DRAM prices not only failed to rise but continued to plummet, resulting in an overall loss for the company. It is surprising that the company, which specializes in DRAM, did not better understand the risks involved. Their negligence led to significant losses.
皇田做汽車窗簾的，本業還不錯，
ROE 30%，配息穩定。
2008年公司操作外匯衍生性金融商品虧超過了一個股本。
做外銷或有外幣部位的公司或多或少都會操作外匯，
為了避險，
皇田卻想賺更多押大注，因而虧超過一個股本。
後來是財務主管下台，
我不相信種事情財務主管可以決定，應該是老闆的問題。
現在公司已恢復正常，股價漲到200元。
Macauto (9951.TW) specializes in producing automotive curtains, and its core business is performing very well. The company boasts a ROE of 30%, and its dividend payouts are stable. However, in 2008, Macauto engaged in foreign exchange derivatives trading, resulting in a significant loss of capital. Companies that export products often have foreign exchange positions and engage in foreign exchange trading to some degree. In an attempt to increase profits, Macauto took a larger bet, which ultimately resulted in a loss of equity. The treasurer responsible for these actions later stepped down. I believe that the responsibility for these decisions should lie with the company's leadership rather than the financial manager. Currently, the company has returned to a state of normalcy, and its stock price has risen to NT$200.
光洋科做貴金屬回收，難免會去玩商品期貨。
2016年2月油價跌到最低26美元一桶，
鐵礦砂價格創歷史新低，
公司因此大賠。
玩衍生性金融商品無法從財報上看得出來。
Solar Applied Materials Technology (1785.TW) specializes in recovering precious metals and is inevitably involved in commodity futures. In February 2016, oil prices dropped to as low as $26 per barrel, and iron ore prices hit a record low, resulting in significant losses for the company. Despite this, the company's financial reports do not indicate any speculative trading of financial derivatives.
還有一種地雷股也是無法事先從財報看出來，
即債務不能展延。
There is another type of landmine stock that cannot be identified in advance from financial reports, which means that the debt cannot be extended.
SDRL 挪威海上鑽油公司，
2018年因大股東不願再背龐大負債而倒閉
SDRL is a Norwegian offshore drilling company that went bankrupt in 2018 because its major shareholders were unwilling to take on significant debts.
GNC 營養藥品商，
2018年因跟銀行談判債務展延不順而倒閉
GNC is a retailer of nutritional supplements that went bankrupt in 2018 due to the failure of debt extension negotiations with banks.
這兩家公司過去獲利都很不錯，
自由現金流量也都是正數，速動比率也正常，
卻因負債不能展延而倒閉或面臨重大危機，
這也是從財報無法事先看出來的。
Despite having made substantial profits in the past, with positive free cash flow and a normal quick ratio, these two companies went bankrupt because their debts could not be extended. This was not apparent in advance from their financial reports.
財務分析的前題是假定債務可以展延，
否則不必分析，9成的公司都會倒閉，
除非是現金大於負債的公司，這種公司不多。
The premise of financial analysis is the assumption that a company's debt can be extended. Without this assumption, there would be little need for analysis, as 90% of companies would likely go bankrupt. There are only a few companies with more cash than debt.
根據我會計師的意見，
負債不能展延的案例很少見，
因為其實銀行更怕公司倒閉，
變成呆帳，銀行將成最直接受害者，
多半會讓公司展延，
搞到無法展延一定有不為外界所知的理由，
只有銀行和公司知道。
According to my accountant Wu, there are very few cases where debts cannot be extended because banks are more afraid of company failures. If debts turn into bad debts, banks become the most direct victims. In most cases, debt can be extended. When it cannot be extended, there must be reasons unknown to the public, which only banks and companies are aware of.
Kayee (2939.TW) is a trading company that may face NT$1 billion in liquidated damages due to internal control negligence in the procurement of medical gloves and lightweight circulating oil, failure to evaluate suppliers, and major deficiencies such as signing contracts after stamping. The stock has been downgraded to full delivery shares since November 30, 2020. While it is not related to false accounts or embezzlement of public funds, it cannot be detected from On's table.
凱羿-KY，貿易公司
因醫療手套以及輕質循環油採購內控疏失，未對供應商進行評鑑，在用印之後才簽約等重大缺失，導致可能得認列10億違約金。
自2020年11月30日起打入全額交割股。
既非作假帳，亦不是掏空，盈再表當然看不出來
Kayee (2939.TW) is a trading company that may face NT$1 billion in liquidated damages due to internal control negligence in the procurement of medical gloves and lightweight circulating oil, failure to evaluate suppliers, and major deficiencies such as signing contracts after stamping. The stock has been downgraded to full delivery shares since November 30, 2020. While it is not related to false accounts or embezzlement of public funds, it cannot be detected from On's table.
- 講稿 1/21：歡迎 (Lecture 1/21 Welcome)
- 講稿 2/21：知與不知 (Lecture 2/21 Knowable and unknowable)
- 講稿 3/21：巴六點 (Lecture 3/21 Buffett's Six Criteria)
- 講稿 4/21：物美價廉 (Lecture 4/21 Cheap and fine)
- 講稿 5/21：還原股價 (Lecture 5/21 Adjusted stock price)
- 講稿 6/21：高ROE (Lecture 6/21 High ROE)
- 講稿 7/21：配得出現金 (Lecture 7/21 High dividends)
- 講稿 8/21：會計 (Lecture 8/21 Accounting)
- 講稿 9/21：地雷股 (Lecture 9/21 Landmine stocks)
- 講稿 10/21：他們通通是錯的 (Lecture 10/21 They are all wrong)
- 講稿 11/21：不會變的公司 (Lecture 11/22 Durable)
- 講稿 12/21：多種果樹 (Lecture 12/21 Diversification)
- 講稿 13/21：IRR (Lecture 13/21 IRR)
- 講稿 14/21：現金殖利率的毒害 (Lecture 14/21 The poison of cash yield)
- 講稿15/21：GDP理論 (Lecture 15/21 GDP Theory)
- 講稿 16/21：全世界都成立 (Lecture 16/21 Globally applicable)
- 講稿17/21：不要想太多 (Lecture 17/21 Do not think too much)
- 講稿 18/21：玩融資期貨選擇權是悲劇的開始 (Lecture 18/21 Margin trading, futures and options are the beginnings of a tragedy)
- 講稿 19/21：基金太貴，不做代操 (Lecture 19/21 Funds are too expensive, don’t manage other's funds)
- 講稿 20/21：股債不是蹺蹺板 (Lecture 20/21 Stock debt is not a seesaw)
- 講稿 21/21：技術分析 (Lecture 21/21 Technical analysis)
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