他們忘了我是外資研究員出身的，
從20多年前當研究員的第一天起就知道要看營收。
我寫過20-30頁個股大報告好幾本，
不僅翻爛過財報、公開說明書、剪報、產業報告、公司拜訪過好幾次，
要分析到多細都做過。
那些只是每個月追蹤營收或翻幾頁財報，就自以為在分析公司的人，
才是沒寫過研究報告的「外行人」。
現在我就來教大家怎麼分析營收：
因為那沒預測性，這個月營收成長，不代表接下來仍會成長。
營收要怎麼分析 ? 要把它拆開，
sales breakdown by product 或 by customer。
by product要看它哪幾樣產品賣得好，
未來能否賣得更好 ? 要去了解它的產品的功能、市場性，
根據供需關係去做市場預測。
這些客戶的前景又是如何，
就像鴻海的最大客戶是蘋果，占營收4成，
要分析蘋果的產品前景，
才能預估出鴻海營收未來的成長性。
要知道各產品的成本結構，毛利率
甚至要做敏感度分析，
看各種材料價格上升多少會讓成本增加多少 ?
像IC封裝的材料molding compound、連接線金或銅占成本多少，
1994年Sumitomo的epoxy resin廠爆炸，
就得估出對IC封裝的成本增加多少 ?
這才是成本分析。
絕非只是追蹤成長率那麼膚淺。
只不過我越來越不認為這是一套對的方法。
就像外資楊應超寫的鴻海聖經，
一定跟郭台銘搞得很熟才能寫出那麼多內部細節，
結果呢 ? 最近把鴻海的目標價調低了。
為什麼 ? 因為外資那一套分析方法也看不了太遠 !!
一家公司若
1. 過去展現過高ROE的記錄，
2. 配得出現金，
3. 產業地位穩固
就幾乎可以確定是能維持高ROE的公司，
縱使還有少許不確定的部份就透過多種果樹把變壞的風險限制住。
接下來只要在股價便宜時買進，
便保證投資報酬率最大，
除此之外還需知道其它什麼東西呢 ?
就曉得真的就這麼簡單了。
是不是我的方法跟衪最接近 !
若沒時間看完年報，只看這一段就好
2007年報
Businesses – The Great, the Good and the Gruesome
Let's take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we're at it, let's also discuss what we wish to avoid.
Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren't available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stockmarket purchases. It's better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone. A truly great business must have an enduring "moat" that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business "castle" that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company's being the lowcost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with "Roman Candles," companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed. Our criterion of "enduring" causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change 能好很久的標準讓我們排除快速變遷的產業. Though capitalism's "creative destruction" is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.
Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.
But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area's premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership's moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can't name its CEO.
Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business 在穩定的產業中具有長期的競爭優勢是我們尋找的企業. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. 高ROE＋高成長＝great。But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There's no rule that you have to invest money where you've earned it. 高ROE但無法高成長＝good，只要把配出來的現金再去找別的投資標的即可。Indeed, it's often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can't for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return. 高ROE卻配不出現金，不易長期維持高ROE。
Let's look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See's Candy. The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn't grow. Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years. Indeed, I believe that See's, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry's earnings.
At See's, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972. (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire .) Last year See's sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually. Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See's family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire .
We bought See's for $25 million when its sales were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 million. The capital then required to conduct the business was $8 million. (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.) Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital. Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations. First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable. Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.
Last year See's sales were $383 million, and pre-tax profits were $82 million. The capital now required to run the business is $40 million. This means we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See's has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to "be fruitful and multiply" is one we take seriously at Berkshire .)
There aren't many See's in Corporate America. Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 million to $82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth. That's because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.
A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment. There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 million pre-tax on $400 million of net tangible assets. But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See's situation. It's far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements. Ask Microsoft or Google.
One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety. This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of. It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.
Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow. When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 million, and its net investment in fixed assets was $570 million. Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 million. But capital expenditures have totaled $1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced. (A simulator can cost us more than $12 million, and we have 273 of them.) Our fixed assets, after depreciation, now amount to $1.079 billion. Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 million, a gain of $159 million since 1996. That gain gave us a good, but far from See's-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million. Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business. Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations. For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category. We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.
Now let's move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk , he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.
The airline industry's demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain.
In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.
To sum up, think of three types of "savings accounts." The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.
好學生特質：
產品不變+高市占
產品會變+多角化
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